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Abstract 
 
What determines the choice of a nation state to form, to join, or to remain in a trans-national 
regional organization (TRO), and how and why does the nature of its political regime matter?  
This theoretical paper analyzes the relationship between different types of national regimes and 
their likely strategies with regard to regionalism in post-Cold War period.  “Real existing 
democracies” and “real existing autocracies” are confronted with the prospects of entering into 
and supporting arrangements for regional integration and/or regional cooperation. It attempts 
to answer the theoretical questions: (1) What determines such a choice; and (2) How much the 
difference in regime type contributes to it. The paper aims to contribute to the literature on 
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Armenia’s Choice  
 
On April 9, 2018, the newly elected president of Armenia, Armen Sarkissian, in his inaugural 
speech, stated: “Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union and the Comprehensive 
and Enhanced Cooperation Agreement as signed with the EU open up new prospects and 
opportunities for our country’s development”.2  In the aftermath of the subsequent Velvet 
Revolution 3, the future Prime-Minister-to-be, Nikol Pashinyan, surprisingly echoed the speech 
of the deposed president.  He stated: “If I am elected, Armenia will not make changes in the 
foreign policy domain; it will remain a member of the EAEU [Eurasian Economic Union] and 
the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] led by Russia. This position does not stem 
from a person’s taste, but the logic of the movement that brought victory to the people. 
Demanding numerous changes in domestic life, the people did not and do not demand any 
change in foreign policy domain. We considered and consider Russia the strategic ally of 
Armenia...”4  Pashinyan also stated that his intention to remain in the Russia-led Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU) is incompatible with signing an association agreement on a free trade 
area with the EU.5 The stance of Armenia’s President and new Prime Minister is in line with 
all of their predecessors: former presidents Levon Hakobi Ter-Petrosyan (1991–1998), Robert 
Kocharyan (1998–2008) and Serzh Sargsyan (2008–2018). The political leaders of Armenia 
have chosen consistently to retain the country’s membership of the two Russian-led regional 
organizations, instead of signing an association agreement with the European Union. 
Armenia’s choice between these options is illustrative of two different paths to regionalism: 
toward the slow process of integration with the Club of Democracies (EU) versus more 
immediate cooperation within the Two Clubs of Autocracies (CSTO and EAEU).  
The case of Russia-led transnational regional organizations (TROs) stands out in the family of 
modern autocracies worldwide due to the profound and prolonged historical legacies of their 
former status in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Unlike Western Europe, the 
beginning of the journey toward regionalism started with a high level of prior integration and 
interdependence among former Soviet republics. They were deeply interconnected by oil and 
gas infrastructure, trade links embedded in the centralized economy of the USSR, and even a 
common language.6 Despite this inheritance, all the efforts of Russia to establish functioning 
                                                          
1 The authors of this project are listed alphabetically and they contributed equally to this paper. 
2 The Portal of the President of the Republic of Armenia “Statements and Messages of the RA” (April 9, 2018),  
https://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/04/09/President-Armen-Sargsyans-speech-
during-inauguration-ceremony/  (accessed on April 2, 2019). 
3 The Velvet Revolution in Armenia took place throughout April 2018 in the form of mass protests against the 
previous president of Armenia, Sargsyan (in power from 2008 to 2018), who had stated his intention to become 
PM in 2018. As a result of the revolution, PM Sargsyan resigned and the National Assembly elected Pashinyan 
as a new PM. See Mirim Lanskoy and Elspeth Suthers, “Armenia's Velvet Revolution,” Journal of Democracy, 
30, no. (2019): 85-99. 
4   News.am (2018) “Main arguments of Armenia PM candidate’s address at Parliament” (May 1, 2018), 
https://news.am/eng/news/449135.html (accessed on April 3, 2019). 
5 Ibid. There is no mystery regarding the motivation of Armenia: Russia is the only security ally for Armenia in 
the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, see Alexander Libman and Anastassia V. Obydenkova, 
“Regional International Organizations as a Strategy of Autocracy: The Eurasian Economic Union and Russian 
foreign policy,” International Affairs, 94, no. 5 (2018): 1037–1058. 
6  On historical legacies in post-Soviet space see: Tomila Lankina, Alexander Libman, and Anastassia V. 
Obydenkova “Appropriation and Subversion: Pre-communist literacy, Communist Party Saturation, Post-
Communist Democratic Outcomes,” World Politics 68, no. 2 (2016): 229-274; Alexander Libman and Anastassia 
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regional integration have failed, while regional cooperation can be considered relatively 
successful. This leads to the plausible assumption that it has been the autocratic nature of the 
political regimes of these former states of the USSR that has been the primary reason for the 
failure of such efforts at integration. 
This brings us to a broader theoretical question: How much and why do national political 
regimes matter for regional integration and cooperation in the 21st century? According to 
orthodox theories of international relations, they should be irrelevant (or at least, much less 
important) than the configuration of power relations among member states and their location 
in the broader international relations system.  Recent studies, however, addressed this question 
by studying the formation of antidemocratic alliances, diffusion effects associated with 
regional organizations within fast growing literature on regionalism and with non-democratic 
international cooperation dictated by regime survival, international and national security policy 
choices within literature on international dimension of autocracy. 7  Others addressed this 
question by singling out non-democratic TROs worldwide and studying the differences in their 
memberships and their impact on national regimes.8 In contrast, a different set of studies 
focused on TROs, in general, and on the EU, in particular, democratic external impact and the 
consequences of the recent economic crisis on this nexus.9 Within these very recent debates, 
this essay focuses on a different, but related, puzzle: the relation between the type of regime 
and the potential for engaging in regionalism between voluntarily consenting national 
politicians. The paper excludes from the analysis a consideration of the “imperial” possibility 
that both types of regime seek to simply impose a regional order by ideological hegemony or 
physical coercion.  In purely historical terms, involuntary imperialism has been much more 
successful in defining and sustaining regions than either of the voluntary strategies, but in the 
contemporary world, peaceful and consensual strategies seem more productive and frequent.   
 
The Basic Concepts 
We have to begin with a conceptual clarification of two dichotomous notions that distinguish 
first between political regimes: real existing democracy (RED) and real existing autocracy 
                                                          
V. Obydenkova, “CPSU legacies and regional democracy in contemporary Russia. Political Studies 63, no. S1 
(2015): 173-190; “Inequality and historical legacies: evidence from post-communist regions,” Post-Communist 
Economies 31, no. 6 (2019): 699-724; “Proletarian Internationalism in Action? Communist Legacies and Attitudes 
Towards Migrants in Russia,” Problems of Post-Communism, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2019.1640068 (2019); 
Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman “The Survival of Post-Communist Corruption in Contemporary 
Russia: The Influence of Historical Legacies”, Post-Soviet Affairs 31 no. 4 (2015): 304-338; Zafar Nazarov and 
Anastassia V. Obydenkova “Democratization and Firm Innovation: Evidence from the European and Central 
Asian post-Communist States” Post-Communist Economies Online first: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2020.1745565 (2020). 
7  Fredrik Söderbaum, Rethinking Regionalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Laurence Whitehead, 
“Antidemocracy Promotion: Four Strategies in Search of a Framework” in Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 10(2): 
1-24; Whitehead, Laurence (2018) “Three Angles on the Alliance Options of Authoritarian Regimes,” Taiwan 
Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2014): 1-24. 
8 Alexander Libman and Anastassia Obydenkova, “Informal governance and participation in non-democratic 
international organizations,” The Review of International Organizations 8, no. 2 (2013): 221-245; “Understanding 
Authoritarian Regionalism,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 4 (2018): 151-165. 
9 Carlos Closa, Secession from a Member State and Withdrawal from the European Union: Troubled Membership 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Anastassia Obydenkova, “Democratization at 
the Grassroots: the European Union's External Impact,” Democratization 19, no. 2 (2012): 230-257; Leonardo 
Morlino and Mario Quaranta, “What is the impact of economic crisis on democracy? Evidence from Europe” 
International Political Science Review 37, no. 5 (2016): 1-16. 
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(REA), and, then, the options that exist for regional integration (RI) and regional cooperation 
(RC).  
RED (liberal, representative, constitutional, private capitalist) and REA10 (illiberal, delegative, 
a-or un-constitutional and usually state capitalist) represent the ideal-type antimonies of regime 
actually practiced in Europe and elsewhere. Both can be further broken down into hybrids and 
sub-types and these may be relevant for explaining outcomes at the regional level.11  For 
example, one could argue that autocratic regimes whose governments are composed of a stable 
coalition of locally dominant elites would be more likely to enter into and support arrangements 
for RC than autocracies based on a single individual, party or military hierarchy.  Among real 
existing contemporary regimes, at least half of them are hybrids.  These semi-democracies and 
semi-autocracies belong to so-called “gray” zone between REDs and REAs and have been 
mushrooming since the 1990s.12 Hybrids can be described metaphorically as examples of 
Schrödinger's cat paradox: whether seemingly democratic or autocratic, they can be 
simultaneously alive or dead as long as they are not exposed to the daylight of world politics. 
This phenomenon is especially important for our topic since they can potentially become either 
REDs or REAs, depending on their membership of TROs, which could be a crucial factor for 
consolidating one type of regime or the other. The case of Armenia as a semi-autocracy is very 
illustrative in this context. If Armenia had signed an association agreement with the EU, as was 
initially foreseen, its democratic consolidation might have come faster and been more secure. 
By contrast, closer cooperation with a REA, such as Russia, inevitably implies increased 
communication and value diffusion, which is more likely to contribute to the consolidation of 
a non-democratic regime.13 Despite the critical importance of hybrids, we will focus primarily 
on the distinction between REDs and REAs, since dealing with hybrid regimes would take us 
into multiple and possibly endless combinations of both of these ideal-types. 
Our second conceptual distinction is between regional integration (RI), which creates some 
degree of supra-national political authority at the regional level, and regional cooperation (RC), 
which does not depend on supra-nationalist institutions but rests on voluntary (and usually 
unanimous) agreement and can be relatively easily abrogated. Further distinctions beyond this 
dichotomy may be useful when defining the range and extent of regional outcomes.  Not only 
do both RI and RC arrangements cover a wide range of different functional tasks and levels of 
authority (with the EU currently being the most developed in both regards), they may also be 
                                                          
10  There is a good deal of confusion concerning the nomenclature of “non-democracies,” partly generated 
by the obvious fact that there is much more internal variety to this group than among “real-existing” democracies.  
We have preferred to use “autocracy” as the logical antonym to “democracy” – not because all of them are ruled 
by a single individual but because they all are characterized by autonomy from accountability to their respective 
subjects-cum-citizens. “Authoritarian” will not do because all political regimes are based upon authority – whether 
legitimate or not. About democracies, also see Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter, “What Democracy Is. . . and Is 
Not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991): 75-88.  
11 For example, Vivian Schmidt argued that national democratic regimes that already have an internal institutional 
order of federalism or decentralization are more likely to enter into and subsequently support the expansion of 
regional integration.  Vivian Schmidt, Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006); Vivian Schmidt, (2007) Democratizing France: The Political and Administrative History 
of Decentralization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
12 Steven Levitsky and Lucas Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
13 Previous studies convincingly demonstrated the autocracy diffusion taking place through the foreign trade and 
communication with autocracies, see Alexander Libman and Anastassia Obydenkova, “International trade as a 
limiting factor in democratization: An analysis of subnational regions in post-communist Russia,” Studies in 
comparative international development 49, no 2 (2014): 168-196; Tomila Lankina, Alexander Libman, Anastassia 
V. Obydenkova, “Authoritarian and Democratic Diffusion in Post-Communist Regions,” Comparative Political 
Studies 49, no. 12 (2016): 1599 – 1629. 
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combined in various ways.  For example, the North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA) is predominantly an instrument of RC, but it does have an appeals procedure the 
verdicts of which presumably carry some authoritative supra-national legitimacy.14 
Our working hypothesis is that REDs have the potential to enter into and successfully 
promote RI and/or RC, while REAs are only capable of engaging in RC.  Nota bene that 
regionalism in both cases is problematic and contingent. The countries involved may enter into 
such larger-scale (but territorially limited) commitments, but they are not compelled to do so.  
They may also proclaim their support for more integrative or cooperative policies, only to 
refuse to implement them subsequently (MERCOSUR seems to be the champion in this 
regard).  Just to confuse matters further, under conditions of “open regionalism,” the same 
national regime may enter into various regional organizations of differing memberships and 
levels of commitment, and then behave in a contradictory fashion within any or all of them. 
Alternatively, regional memberships can be incompatible and a nation state (e.g., Armenia) 
may face a “dichotomous destiny”, having to commit to either a TRO of autocracies or to a 
TRO composed of democracies. The choice can be even more crucial if that state’s regime is 
hybrid at the point of origin since its future destiny could be democratized through involvement 
in RI or slide toward autocracy through RC.15  
In what follows, we consider first why REDs and RI are potentially related to each other in a 
more positive way.  
 
1. REDs do not pose a security threat to each other.  They may have many, even 
highly salient, conflicts of interest, but they are not expected to resolve them with 
the use of armed force – and do not engage in contingency planning for this 
eventuality.  This means that, in the absence of a mutually recognized “security 
dilemma,” REDs can afford to be relatively indifferent to the inevitable 
inequalities of benefit generated by regional integration or cooperation since there 
are not likely to be translated into a relevant shifts in the capacity to exercise 
international coercion.  
2. REDs are liberal in nature, i.e. they respect the property rights of their citizens.  
This presumption of a reliable and fair rule of law at the national level provides 
assurance that REDs will also treat each other’s nationals reliably and fairly. This, 
in turn, lowers the  perception of risk and, thereby, encourages foreign trade and 
direct investment among member states.  Liberal democracies are also associated 
with greater transparency in policy-making and lower levels of corruption – both 
of which contribute to increasing mutual trust among them and to their respected 
TROs – a factor highly important for successful RI.16  A shared conception of the 
rule of law across nation states also implies that decisions of a supra-national 
regional court (if one exists) will be implemented accurately and regularly – even 
routinely. 
                                                          
14 With Donald Trump presidency, NAFTA will be substituted by The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement 
(USMCA): “United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement” Office of the United States Trade Representative: 
Executive Office of the President (2020) https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-
mexico-canada-agreement  (accessed on March 9, 2020). 
15  In 2013, Armenia stated for the first time its decision to prioritize membership in a Customs Union led by 
Russia instead of signing a free trade pact with the EU, see Andrew Rettman, “Armenia to join Russia's Union, 
surprises EU,”  EUobserver (published on September 3, 2013), https://euobserver.com/foreign/121304 (accessed 
on January 12, 2019). 
16 Schultz, Kenneth A. “Frontmatter.” Frontmatter. In Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, i-viii. Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; James D. Fearon, “Domestic 
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 
3 (1994): 577-592. 
7 
 
3. REDs accord and should guarantee the rights of their citizens to form, join and 
use political parties, interest associations and social movements, and they can be 
expected to at least tolerate the same forms of collective action across their 
borders with respect to citizens from other member states. These public activities 
serve as an additional “check” on arbitrary governmental action and on their 
fulfillment of commitments to RI. The interconnection is quite intuitive: freedom 
of mass media associated with RED makes the politics transparent. That is, if a 
government fails in its commitment, the public will be informed by the mass 
media, which will be followed by eventual punishment by the electorate, which 
will become more likely to vote for the existing political opposition.  
4. REDs are typically institutionally rooted in some form of horizontal 
accountability – although these systems of checks and balances are likely to vary 
considerably among them.  Under such arrangements of authority, other member 
states have a greater guarantee against radical changes in policy and are less likely 
to be preoccupied by the eventual changes of the party in power.   
5. REDs typically (but not inevitably) have party systems that are centripetal, i.e. 
they compete for the affiliation/compliance of citizens with moderate “centrist” 
preferences – which provides an additional assurance against radical shifts in 
policy due to rotations of the party in power.17  
6. REDs in an RI arrangement are more likely to create or be forced to accept some 
degree of internal democracy in its transnational institutions, which provides yet 
another mechanism of reassurance, this time against the hegemonic pretensions 
of any one or group of member states.  This is especially the case if (as is likely) 
the system of representation for a regional parliament or executive systematically 
over-represents the smaller member states. 
7. Finally, REDs tolerate and even encourage the freedom of the mass media to 
monitor their performance.  This has often been described as “the fourth power” 
in the liberal system of checks and balances. This tends to be associated with 
greater transparency in policy-making and lower corruption of public officials. 
These three aspects – mass media, transparency, and low corruption – together 
provide an additional foundation for transnational trust that is crucial for the 
successful development of RI.  
 
Now, we will simply turn each of these affirmations around and see hypothetically why REAs 
are much less likely to enter into and respect the supra-national commitments intrinsic to RIs.  
1. REAs certainly do not inevitably go to war with each other, even less so in 21st century. 
Regional cooperation serves as platform for communication among non-democratic 
states, where democracies are also occasionally welcome (e.g., case of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), African Union (AU) or the SCO). REAs can 
often enter into alliances to go to war together against REDs.  The alliance of China and 
Russia is very illustrative in this context: both states perceive the US and NATO as an 
enemy and follow the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. Allying with each 
other within the framework of such regional organization as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) is a demonstration to the West of the existence of security allies. Yet, 
despite this, the two states distrust each other: e.g., China tried to launch a number of 
military-security initiatives within the SCO across former Soviet Central Asian states that 
                                                          
17  Although since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the mechanism of partisan competition has become 
more centrifugal, shifting towards preferences for right and left-wing extremists both in Europe and the USA.  
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Russia considers its “near abroad”, and Russia blocked this initiative. When Russia, 
instead, launched the Collective Security Treaty Organization, China wanted to be a 
member and Russia rejected its request. So, threat of violence, lack of trust, and keeping 
undivided control over satellite states (the so-called “near abroad”) are always present in 
the relations between REAs.  This means that the gains from regionalism, if they are 
asymmetrically distributed (as they usually are), can translate into an enhancement of the 
persistent “security dilemma” that affects their relations to the extent that, by increasing 
the relative power of the dominant member state, it may become sufficient to increase the 
threat of subordination or conquest of those that are less benefited.  RIs composed of 
REAs will rarely, if ever, have resolved this Security Dilemma before their beginning and 
not be able to rely upon it in order to make subsequent progress. 
2. REAs are illiberal in nature, i.e. they do not have national judicial institutions that ensure 
respect for the property rights and contractual obligations of their own citizens, even less 
for foreigners. An excellent example of this would be Venezuela keeping its funds in the 
UK and in other democratic states. Despite the fact that Putin’s government is one of the 
few to support his regime, Maduro has consistently stored his financial resources 
elsewhere and not in Russia. Despite the fact that Venezuela has “nationalized” 
enterprises founded and funded  by the Western companies, its government preferred the 
relative safety of their banks.18  
3. REAs are not likely to agree to submit disputes with regional partners to a court with 
supra-national authority or, where such a court exists, to respect its judgments.  To the 
extent that RI requires some mechanism for dispute resolution to be effective, this alone 
may preclude membership of REAs. RC arrangements presumably do not require such 
arrangements and can rely exclusively on national or sub-national level dispute 
procedures. 
4. REAs are governed by rulers, some of whom may be elected – but only in constituencies 
in which they are the only likely winners.  These rulers are organized into a single 
hierarchy of offices according to partisan, military, ideological or normative principles 
that are exclusive to a specific nation state – not based upon principles that are shared by 
regional partners – even if they are also nominally based on the same generic principles 
of authority. Without such an effective agreement on the basis of legitimacy – and the 
subsequent possibility of arbitrary decision-making – the creation of a regional polity is 
not likely – only a cooperative arrangement that can be abrogated at a low cost.  
5. REAs do not accord to their subjects/citizens an unrestricted right to form parties, 
associations or movements.  Some of these units of collective action may be tolerated, but 
only under conditions that restrict their autonomy, including their right to enter into 
agreements with foreign counterparts.  Some REAs do sponsor the creation of elaborate 
                                                          
18 Tass News “Венесуэла должна выплатить ConocoPhillips $8 млрд по спору вокруг национализации” 
(March 8, 2018), https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6200337 (accessed on December 21, 2018. Chavez nationalized the 
company ConocoPhilips  (Netherlands) in 2007 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB%2f07%2f30   (accessed on February 
19, 2020); International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, World Bank Group “Conoco Phillips 
Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (Case No. ARB/07/30): 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB%2f07%2f30 
(accessed on March 30, 2020). Venezuela owes over 8 milliards USD compensation to this company. Among 
autocracies, the failure to respect investment is just as bad: Venezuela owes Russia 17 milliards USD for Russian 
investment. Yet, it is clear that Putin will never ask for this debt to be repaid and Maduro will most certainly not 
even consider the repayment of this investment to Russia. Similar trends are exhibited by other REAs, such as 
Tajikistan (anthropological notes with entrepreneur who investigated the investment climate in Tajikistan). The 
CCP leaders still debate how to respond to states which cannot re-pay loans provided by China. 
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“corporatist” hierarchies of representative groups, but these remain strictly confined to 
national borders. 
6. REAs typically have no de jure institutions of horizontal accountability, although de facto 
practices may exist in the competitive relations between ideological factions, military and 
security services, local notables, etc.  The unpredictability of these arrangements, 
especially in the context of leadership succession, and their confinement to national 
contexts, renders uncertain the continuity of regime commitment to the institutions of RI. 
7. REAs vary considerably in the configuration of political parties – from none at all, to a 
proliferation of regime-loyal ones.  Usually, however, there is a single dominant party 
with informally competing factions and no guarantee that these factions will compete 
centripetally. Therefore, presuming that support for RI is strongest among those in the 
center of the political spectrum, REAs are more likely than REDs to vary considerably 
from one government to another in their support for RI. 
8. REAs are not likely to be under strong pressure from their constituent units or their rulers 
to introduce internally democratic practices within RI institutions.  Where such things as 
parliaments, elections, consultative bodies, decentralization, etc. do exist, they are usually 
only symbolic, decorative, imitative, and irrelevant for the process of regionalism, which 
remains exclusively dependent upon on-going (and often, ad hoc) negotiations between 
national executives.19 An example would be the references to human rights, rule of law 
and democracy in some constitutions of non-democracy but also their recognition within 
RC, such as in the SADC Treaty.20 Most recent studies referred to this phenomenon as 
“techniques intended to cultivate the pretense of accountability without permitting the 
actual practice of it” (e.g., Southeast Asia autocracies demonstrated “mock compliance to 
human rights agreements, public relations firms, think tanks and zombie monitors”.21  
9. REAs, though not dependent upon the electorate, do understand the power of public 
opinion to generate social unrest, rebellion, and even revolution. Therefore, they expend 
considerable state resources in controlling the ownership and content of mass media.  
Government decisions with regard to membership in or sponsorship of TROs are 
invariably portrayed as beneficial for everyone.22  This can guarantee to government 
officials an ample margin for corruption, given the absence of transparency and, hence, 
accountability. These factors result in a generalized distrust among both democratic and 
autocratic potential partners in the process of regionalism.  
 
                                                          
19  Andres Malamud, “Presidentialism and Mercosur: A Hidden Cause for A Successful Experience” in 
Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Finn Laursen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 53-
73 has coined the term “inter-presidentialism” to describe it. Also on decentralization in hybrid regimes, 
autocracies, and democracies, see Leonardo Morlino and Wojciech Sadurski (eds.) Democratization and the EU. 
Comparing Central and Eastern European Post-Communist Countries (London: Routledge, 2010); Anastassia 
Obydenkova and Wilfried Swenden, “Autocracy-Sustaining Versus Democratic Federalism: Explaining the 
Divergent Trajectories of Territorial Politics in Russia and Western Europe,” Territory, Politics, Governance 1, 
no.1 (2013): 86-112. 
20 Laurie Nathan, Community of Insecurity: SADC’s Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa (Farham: 
Ashgate, 2012) 
21 Lee Morgenbesser, “The menu of autocratic innovation,” Democratization, Online first: DOI: 
10.1080/13510347.2020.1746275 (accessed on March 29, 2020) 
22 This is even more so, when Russia is deeply involved in the mass media of other former Soviet states to such 
an extent that it is capable of organizing a revolution against the government of one of its regional “partners.” The 
case of Kyrgyzstan is especially illustrative in this context. The People’s Revolution (also known as the April 
Revolution) of 2010 was staged by Russian mass media. Paradoxically, the Revolution ended with the 
establishment of a new government, yet pro-Russian in foreign policy choices (as a result, the NATO base in 
Manas was closed by this new government). 
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In addition to the above-listed differences, another difference between REDs and REAs 
concerns the motives for creating or entering into regional organizations. As argued above, 
REAs are not only or even primarily interested in intrinsic economic benefits, but also and 
mainly they are interested in extrinsic political objectives.  With some simplification, it is safe 
to state that REDs are motivated mainly by internal benefits (e.g., public support and economic 
gains). In contrast, REAs are driven mainly by external factors: in addition to economic 
benefits, demonstrating to the world the existence of security allies, associated with this 
potential rhetorical support from TROs on non-democratic practices (thus, augmenting public 
support), and providing an alternative to membership in exclusively democratic “regional 
clubs”.23 Also a non-democracy finds easier to cooperation with another non-democracy, as 
long as cooperation within region serves its pragmatic benefits.24 In line with recent literature 
on driving factors of membership in international organizations with or without a regional 
dimension, it seems to be a safe assumption that security interests are dominant factors in their 
search for membership in TROs. In the words of Davis and Pratt, the “geopolitical origins of 
IGO membership constitute a key mechanism linking economic cooperation to security 
interests”.25  The general assumption that autocracy supports autocracies, while true when 
support is rhetorical, is not sustained when security issues come along. Putin’s regime 
rhetorically supports Maduro’s regime in Venezuela as well as Communist China in Russian 
official mass media. Despite this, China was not welcome to join the Russia-led security TRO 
(the CSTO). More importantly, an REA may support and even lobby for the membership of 
hybrid regimes or democracies in its own TRO. Russia welcomed semi-democratic Armenia 
and Kyrgyzstan to join the Eurasian Economic Union to secure its geopolitical security interests 
in these two states, as well as to eliminate the US connections (in the case of Kyrgyzstan) and 
the EU influence (in the case of Armenia). Moreover, Russia seems to have been involved in 
staging democratic revolutions in both Kyrgyzstan and Armenia using its mass media in these 
states. Moreover, Russia even supported the leader of the democratic opposition in Ukraine 
back in 2011 – Yulia Tymoshenko – to secure the negotiated gas contracts between Russia and 
Ukraine.26 Thus, admittedly, security-geopolitical motivations and economic benefits seem to 
be placed unconditionally above the importance of political regimes when seeking membership 
of TROs. Yet this does not imply that the political regimes of member states do not matter. The 
heterogeneity of political regimes across membership (presence of autocracies and hybrid 




                                                          
23 James Buchanan and Roger L Faith, “Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Towards a Theory of Internal Exit,” 
American Economic Review 77, no. 5 (1987): 1023-1031 introduced the notion of “clubs” to the discussion of 
TROs. 
24 A number of studies are dedicated to explain the puzzle of the Chinese involvement in Africa through purely 
economic and pragmatic lenses of resource-seeking on the part of China, see Cullen S. Hendrix, “What US 
strategy gets wrong about China in Africa” Petersen Institute for International Economics”. Policy Brief 20-3 
(March 2020) https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/what-us-strategy-gets-wrong-about-china-africa 
(accessed on March 27, 2020). 
25 Christina L. Davis and Tyler Pratt, “The Forces of Attraction: How Security Interests Shape Membership in 
Economic Institutions” (July 31, 2018) 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cldavis/files/davispratt_forces_july2018.pdf (accessed on August 3, 2019) 
developed further the idea of geopolitical alignment and security concerns as driving forces of membership in 
regional clubs. 
26 Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman, “Understanding the Foreign Policy of Autocratic Actors: 




The Contending Theories 
 
Understanding these two paths to regionalism – cooperation versus integration – requires 
different theoretical points of departure, just as does explaining the differences in subsequent 
performance between REDs and REAs.  There are two cornerstones of these different 
approaches: (1) whether the intent of the actors involved is transformative or reproductive; and 
(2) whether the expected process is gradual and continuous or erratic and episodic.27  
Theories of RI presume that the intent is transformative and the trajectory is gradual; 
those of RC presume that the intent is reproductive and that the trajectory is episodic.  Needless 
to say, in the real world of politics, not only may it be difficult to discern what the “real” intent 
of actors may be and what are their “real” expectations about performance, but also within any 
given TRO, the actors involved may have different intents and expectations. If those reasons 
for “fuzziness” were not enough, there is also the possibility of unintended outcomes and 
“learning from doing.”  The national states that initiate a given regionalist project may discover 
that emerging problems and opportunities change their perceptions of what is possible, and 
even of what is desirable.28  
Theorizing about RI and RC has proven difficult. The experience of peacefully and 
consensually constructing something as artificial as a transnational, supra-state region is both 
relatively rare and recent – so recent that all such efforts remain manifestly unfinished.29  They 
are still “works in process” whose eventual success or failure is unknown.  
As far as RI is concerned, the “number one” (so far) is the EU, although there are many 
other, self-proclaimed, analogous, regionally-based experiences elsewhere.30  And, even in this 
one case, analysts have diverged radically in their basic assumptions.  The dominant line of 
cleavage has been between so-called “inter-governmentalists” and “neo-functionalists”. The 
former deny that the EU is transformative and emphasize exclusively the episodic bargaining 
                                                          
27 For the initial theorizing on regional international integration and cooperation, also see Philippe Schmitter, “A 
Revised Theory of Regional Integration,” International Organization 24, no. 4 (1970): 836-868; Philippe 
Schmitter, “The “Organizational Development” of International Organizations,” International Organization 25, 
no. 4 (1971): 917-937. 
28  The role of Great Britain in the EU is emblematic of this ambiguity.  It joined the RI process in Europe 
assuming that it was just a free trade area, slightly more comprehensive than the one it was leaving (the European 
Economic Area), only to discover that the process was much more potentially transformative and that it was 
gradually (almost surreptitiously) embedding itself in Britain’s public policy and judicial system.  Its current 
travail in exiting the EU is a near perfect illustration of how unintended consequences and differential expectations 
affect regionalism.  The contrast with President Trump’s threatened exit from NAFTA – purely an instrument of 
RC – by stroke of the executive pen could hardly have been more dramatic. 
29  Cross-national, supra-state regions do not exist, any more than did contemporary national states, at their 
moment of origin.  They have to be created either by integration or cooperation.  Once the effort has been made, 
it is usually followed by a retrospective process of “discovering” their common features – their heritage, their 
symbols, their goals.  Moreover, many of these artefacts have highly ambiguous (and opportunistic) borders.  Old 
members may leave or suspend their participation; new members join when it is mutually convenient – and 
immediately are incorporated into the common identity. 
30  If we remember correctly, the African Union’s founding treaty is a virtual copy of the EU’s re-
founding one – which does not mean that its subsequent accomplishments have been remotely similar – even 
granted the time lapse between the two experiences. Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African 
Development Community makes decorative references to the rule of law, democracy, and human rights: 
Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (2015) 
https://www.sadc.int/files/5314/4559/5701/Consolidated_Text_of_the_SADC_Treaty_-
_scanned_21_October_2015.pdf Accessed on 12 March 2020. 
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between national executives in the creation of successive treaties defining (and usually 
expanding) its institutions and formal competences in a mutual effort to protect their respective 
national interests and the viability of the existing international system.31 The later (we are 
among them) insist that the EU is transformative (often despite the publicly expressed 
preferences of the political elites of its member states) and focus attention on the growing and 
less visible functional interdependence between policy arenas, the subsequent role of 
unintended outcomes, the interaction of political parties, interest associations and social 
movements across national borders, and the sequential resolution of crises generated by 
increased interdependence and uneven outcomes.  
These two “approaches” (neither is a full-blown theory of the entire process) have been 
supplemented (but not replaced) by a third: constructivism.  Like neo-functionalism, it is not 
limited to state actors, but incorporates larger publics affected in their values and identities by 
the integration process.32  Presumably, the individuals that come to assume these regional 
values – those national politicians and administrators who participate directly in it, in the first 
place, but also the wider publics that are indirectly affected by it – will provide a broadening 
basis of potential support for extending the supra-national process. This approach seems to 
presume that member states are democracies, since only under conditions of accountable 
government can rulers be compelled to change their regional policies.  Under REAs, not only 
would they not be induced to change their policies, but they should also be capable of limiting 
their subjects’/citizens’ access to novel and potentially threatening supra-national values and 
identities. 
While the number of efforts at RC is much larger, their institutional variety and 
geographic dispersion has made it difficult even to attempt to explain systematically the 
significance of their similarities and differences. The standard approach has been to apply the 
orthodox “realist” theory of international relations, sometimes modified to incorporate a more 
“liberal” approach that recognizes the potential contribution of national and sub-national 
organizations of civil society.  If some group of more-or-less geographically contiguous 
national states is threatened by a common enemy, they will join together and form a region.33 
[Insert Table One Here] 
 
The Choice between Regionalisms 
 
What determines the choice of an individual national state to form or to join or to remain in a 
regional organization?  As we have argued, democracies can choose between the two generic 
paths of integration or cooperation (or not to join at all); autocracies have been perhaps less 
likely to join voluntarily any regional organization (that they do not unilaterally control, i.e. a 
regional empire), but if and when they do, it will only be a cooperative one.  The extreme case 
of the closest regime in the world – North Korea – is perhaps the most illustrative one. Even 
                                                          
31 Philippe Schmitter, “Twenty-Five Years, Fifteen Findings,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 1 (2010): 17-28 
32  Long before the appearance of constructivists, Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social 
Communication (Boston: M.I.T. Press, 1953) made the changing patterns of social communication due to the 
lowering of barriers to trans-national exchanges by states and regional organizations the central feature of his 
theory of integration. He thought that such a shift in the pattern of communication across borders would lead to a 
shift in collective identities – a new nationality, if you wish. 
33  This impeccable rationale led one of its most dedicated proponents, John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional 
Deterrence (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
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within the situation of famine of the 1990s when a million of people died, the North Korea 
remains isolated from the outside world and blocked humanitarian aid.34 Apparently, having 
learned its lesson, it currently joined G77 and ASEAN Regional Forum. In contrast, another 
isolated extreme autocracy, Turkmenistan, has a relatively strong economy (due to large gas 
resources and oil) and a favorable geopolitical location on the Caspian Sea. Therefore, it can 
allow itself the luxury of isolation: from the long list of the menu of TROs, Turkmenistan only 
joined a non-regional Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It is also the only Central Asian 
state that resisted the temptation to join the SCO founded by China (despite the fact that 
membership in the SCO is associated with vast financial benefits coming from China, in the 
form of subsidies, generous loans and investment in infrastructure). In contrast, the 
economically weak autocracy of Tajikistan was desperate to join SCO, as were all other Central 
Asian states. The case of Turkmenistan stands out in the family of Central Asian states. 
Turkmenistan is the most autocratic state among all former Soviet republics. Human Rights 
Watch described Turkmenistan as “virtually closed to independent scrutiny, media and 
religious freedoms are subject to draconian restrictions, and human rights defenders and other 
activists face the constant threat of government reprisal.” 35  Not only has Turkmenistan 
abstained from joining the lucrative SCO, but it has also managed to escape membership of the 
very first TRO launched by Russia – the Commonwealth of Independent States (1993), which 
emerged in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR.36 It is important to highlight in this 
context, however, that consolidated REAs do not join RC arrangements if they cannot control 
them. In contrast, if a TRO is actually launched by an REA and controlled by it (e.g., China 
launched the SCO and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)), then the nexus of 
involvement of the REA in its own RC is different.37  
The economic strength of a potential member state – whether its regime is REA or RED 
– thus seems to be an important factor affecting its choice to join or not, but the logic is quite 
the opposite for REAs and REDs. The case of Turkmenistan above demonstrates that an 
economically self-sufficient autocracy with a favorable geopolitical location tends to abstain 
from engaging in any RC to secure its total control over national and foreign policy. In contrast, 
an economically strong democracy is likely to join an RC arrangement led by, or composed of, 
autocracies or mixed political regimes, as long as it perceives the membership to be beneficial 
(economically or geopolitically: e.g., India and the SCO). However, an economically weak 
democracy will tend to abstain from joining such an RC arrangement for security reasons (e.g., 
Mongolia and the SCO).  
For REDs, an economically strong state may join a TRO led by autocracies if it 
perceives this membership as beneficial for security or economic reasons. India, for example, 
                                                          
34 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007) 
35 Human Rights Watch (2014) “World Report 2014: Turkmenistan” Available at https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2014/country-chapters/turkmenistan . Accessed on July 25, 2019. 
36 The only membership option picked by Turkmenistan from the large menu of existing options was the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation. 
37 Within this paper we do not consider development regional governance, such as AIIB or Regional Development 
Banks for a simple reason: these TROs with regional dimension are initially and only aimed to economic 
development unlike regional TROs that aspire at least on paper for bigger and more ambitious agenda of regional 
integration. On Regional Development Banks, see Anastassia V. Obydenkova and Vinícius G Rodrigues Vieira, 
“The Limits of Collective Financial Statecraft: Regional Development Banks and Voting Alignment with the 
United States at the United Nations General Assembly”, International Studies Quarterly, 64, no. 1 (2020): 13–
25; Ruth Ben-Artzi, Regional Development Banks in Comparison: Banking Strategies versus Development Goals 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
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joined the SCO in 2015 – when all the other member states were (and still are) autocracies.38 
In contrast, Mongolia is an economically weak democracy and is landlocked and surrounded 
by the SCO member states.  It would seem that it would benefit economically from joining the 
SCO, but has firmly chosen not to do so for security reasons, i.e. its deep distrust regarding the 
objectives of China and in the consequences of its seemingly generous investments and loans. 
The following table summarizes the interplay of political regime and economic strength in 
determining the strategy of states with regard to RC. 
 
Table 2: The role of Political Regimes and Economy in RC 
 
To the above should be added an important caveat: the association only works for consolidated 
regimes – for “extreme” autocracies and for consolidated democracies.39 Those in the “gray 
hybrid zone” exhibit a very different pattern.  For example, autocratic and economically strong 
Kazakhstan participates actively in the TRO led by Russia and China, just as such semi-
autocracies as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan participate in the EAEU led by Russia: Armenia for 
security reasons40 and Kyrgyzstan for purely economic benefits. 
It is also often presumed that RC or RI arrangements that are composed of similar types 
of regimes (e.g., the EU is a regional club for democracies only and exclusively) are more 
likely to attract and to keep member states, but this is unlikely to apply to TROs with only 
autocratic and mixed-regime participants since the basis of authority, institutional format and 
policy objectives in such regimes is much more varied. Obviously, this choice is a complicated 
matter as experience increases with both types of regionalism. Today, it has become almost 
impossible not to be a member of some regional organization – any more than a real-existing 
national state would refuse (if offered) to join the United Nations. Regionalism has become 
part of the “furniture” of contemporary international relations. 
 
Security or Economic Benefits? 
 
With the case of Armenia in mind, let us consider another powerful, parsimonious and 
apparently credible (to some) hypothesis: national states form or join regional organizations 
because it is in their national security interest to do so.  This is actually not very enlightening 
since it seems to involve four assumptions that are important in this context. First, global 
international relations form a more-or-less permanent system based on the relative distribution 
of power in member states and their geographic locations. The stability of global international 
relations is best described as the state of homeostasis – when a system maintains the same set 
of conditions permanently. 41  This dynamic equilibrium of the international system is 
maintained by multiple variables (such as power of state and economic strength, especially if 
it relates to such more-or-less permanent sources as oil and gas, geopolitical conditions and 
climate, etc.). The homeostasis of world politics also conditions the image of the enemy as a 
historical legacy, a factor that is difficult to change in the short-run. The classic example is the 
Israeli-Palestine conflict, which dates back to the 1960s or even to intercommunal conflict in 
                                                          
38 The SCO was founded by China, supported by Russia, and all of its members were Central Asian states (except 
Turkmenistan) before the enlargement in 2015, when India and Pakistan joined it. 
39 This phenomenon was also discovered in Anastassia V. Obydenkova and Alexander Libman. Authoritarian 
Regionalism in the World of International Organizations: Global Perspective and Eurasian Enigma (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019).  
40 Armenia needs the support of Russia in its ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
In this conflict the protection of Armenia’s security can be provided only by Russia. 
41 The theory of homeostasis originally comes from biology but it has been regularly applied to other sciences 
(e.g., it was also used in sociology and psychology). 
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Mandatory Palestine in the 1920s. Not to mention the centuries-long mutual perception of Jews 
and Arabs of each other as enemies and the worst possible threat in the world. Among the more 
recent yet stable historical perceptions of a threat is Russia’s vision of NATO as its natural 
enemy, which dates back to the bipolar world of the Cold War, and remains till now unchanged. 
On the other hand, a similar argument can be made for the US perceiving Russia as a modified 
version of the USSR – as a threat that has to be eliminated. Thus, global international relations 
are a more-or-less permanent system. 
Second and related to the above, the security situation of all national states in this 
system is sufficiently compelling that it overrides all other policy preferences and competing 
interests. The case of Armenia is especially illustrative in this context. Armenia had to choose 
between a lucrative and prestigious opportunity to embark on the journey toward the slow 
integration process within the EU through the signing of a beneficial association agreement 
with the EU or membership of the Russia-led EAEU. The negotiation on the association 
agreement with the EU included a free trade area and dates back to 2010. However, when the 
preparation of the association agreement was almost finalized in 2013, Armenia claimed its 
intention to join the Eurasian Custom Union (currently EAEU) – membership of which is 
incompatible with signing an association agreement and joining a free trade area with the EU, 
known as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). DCFTA included a 
number of economic benefits, such as lower tariffs and other barriers with the EU, and access 
to the EU’s market: “Although Armenia’s trade with EU states far exceeds that with Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan combined [cursive is ours] it remains heavily dependent on Moscow 
for security. Russia still has a military presence in the country, and the alliance is seen as a 
counterbalance to Azerbaijan’s heavy spending on arms purchases, given that the Nagorny 
Karabakh remains unresolved.”42 Indeed, Armenia values its security guarantee provided by 
Russia more than the economic benefits associated with integration within the EU, and more 
than its international image as a result of getting closer to a democratic regional club, such as 
the EU.  
The third and fourth issues presumed by our hypothesis above build on the previous 
discussion in general and the Armenian case in particular. Third, all participating national states 
have the same internal political capacity to reach and sustain agreement on what these security 
interests are. Fourth, whatever the apparent agreement, it is predicated exclusively on the 
survival of the national state as such, not just on the survival of the specific regime or even 
government in power.  
 
 
The Importance of Trust 
 
Two more modest assumptions are: (1) That national states engage in RC for one or a 
combination of three reasons: because they fear a common enemy (security benefits); or/and 
because they perceive a common material advantage (economic benefits); or/and because they 
believe that they can improve their international standing (demonstration effects); and (2) That 
national states engage in RI not only because they have a common enemy or opportunity, but 
also because they have learned to trust each other and, therefore, can safely (and profitably) 
engage in a wider range of functional commitments that require some form and degree of 
                                                          
42 Yekaterina Poghosyan, “Armenia's Receding European Ambitions: Long-awaited EU trade deal seems to 
have been upended by need to stay close to Moscow.” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) (October 




authoritative regulation or (re)distribution at the regional level. The logic and motivation are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 about here. 
 
Put together, these two imply that RC can lead to RI – provided (1) that a functionally 
appropriate learning process encourages them to “spill over” into further policy areas; and (2) 
that they are all REDs, because only under this type of regime can sovereign states learn to 
trust each other.43 Autocracies, even if evenly distributed across the prospective region, cannot 
imitate this “spill-over” dynamic because (1) they have (usually) not resolved the “security 
dilemma” among them before engaging in RC and (2) because the internal political 
characteristics of this form of domination, however legitimate it may appear in specific cases, 
does not encourage the formation of trust – internally or externally.  As a subsidiary hypothesis, 
one can also speculate that TROs for RC with a mixed set of domestic regimes – democracies, 
autocracies and, probably, hybrids – will, at best, remain merely cooperative (vide the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Southern African Development Community, EAEU, 
the Forum on China - Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)). Thus, it seems possible to infer that RC 
will be more intensive and successful among mixed regimes (democracies and autocracies) 
than RC among autocracies and hybrids.44 Mutual trust seems to be the crucial dividing line 
that predetermines the behavior of REDs and REAs within regional organizations.  
Research on trust in international political institutions is almost only limited to 
members of the EU, and thus deserves special attention in the context of our paper, although 
its member states are all (more or less) REDs. Institutional trust influenced by such factors as 
national identity, individual utilitarianism, economic performance, corruption, political culture, 
and the enormous importance of mass media.45 Additionally, in line with constructivism, social 
communication seems a natural pre-condition for developing trust.46 It is also associated with 
shared information and knowledge – another two key ingredients.47  The accuracy of this 
information comes from the quality of independent mass media and can only be found in REDs. 
REAs control mass media and attempt to manipulate public opinion, but are currently less 
successful in controlling access to and use of new social media. Yet, even within young 
democracies, e.g., Central European new member states, such as Poland and Bulgaria, the trust 
in the EU is noticeably higher than trust in their own national governments – this effect is 
explained by public awareness of corruption in their respective national governments versus 
                                                          
43  And, even then, subsequent changes in person and party in power can rapidly erode this patina of inter-
democratic, supra-national trust, as we have seen so dramatically with the erratic and discontinuous behavior of 
the Trump government. 
44 This assumption is in line with the study by Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, 
“Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,” International 
Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 477-513 that identified that most economic cooperation takes place among “only 
[two] democracies”, followed by “mixed dyads”, and that least successful cooperation is between two autocracies. 
We extrapolate this finding from bilateral to multi-lateral cooperation among REDs and REAs within RC versus 
RI. 
45 Mariano Torcal, “The Decline of Political Trust in Spain and Portugal: Economic Performance or Political 
Responsiveness,” American Behavioral Scientist 58, no. 12 (2014): 1–26; Anastassia V. Obydenkova and Bruno 
Arpino, “Corruption and Trust in the European Union and National Institutions: Changes over the Great Recession 
across European States” Journal of Common Market Studies 56, no. 3 (2018): 594-611; Robert Rohrschneider,. 
“The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-Wide Government.” American Journal of Political Science 
46, no. 2 (2002): 463-475. 
46 This idea dates back to Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Boston: M.I.T. Press, 1953) 
47 Klaus Armingeon and Besir Ceka, “The Loss of Trust in the European Union during the Great Recession 




the greater transparency of the EU. On the other hand, the consolidated EU democracies, such 
as Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Norway, Netherlands, have a higher level of trust in national 
institutions and lower trust in the EU.48 The message is that, even within REDs, there can be 
significant variation in the level of trust in international institutions. Somethings similar 
happens to REAs with regard to their national regimes and international trust. Autocracies are 
associated with a higher level of corruption and a lower level of well-being. The population of 
REAs, though manipulated by state-controlled propaganda of mass media, are exposed to 
corruption in everyday life and tend to have a deep distrust in regard to national institutions, 
and perceive international ones as transparent. 49 Thus, the role of political regimes in the 
development of international trust – the crucial component of successful RI – is not always 





REAs lack trust, both nationally and regionally, which seems enough to prevent them 
from engaging in RI.  Nevertheless, political autocracies are still interested in trying to imitate 
the regionalism that emerged among REDs, in order to have economic benefits or provide 
fellow-autocracies with rhetorical support endorsing non-democratic practices and to 
demonstrate to the world that they are not disadvantaged in allies because of their regime type. 
Mimicking the TROs of REDs has become a repeated pattern of behavior for REAs. For 
example, the Treaty of the SADC has references of human rights, democracy, and the rule of 
law.50   After the negotiation of Turkish membership of the EU was deadlocked, Turkey 
switched to an effort toward closer cooperation with the SCO.  The examples of this behavior 
are multiple and suggest that REAs are more motivated to demonstrate to the world the 
existence of regional alternatives for them, even when there are no clear economic benefits or 
security concerns associated with the effort. 
In any specific instance, many other factors are likely to play a role.  Regionalism is not an 
imperative, it is a conscious (and potentially costly) policy choice.  Granted that it has become 
so widespread in contemporary international relations that “everyone seems to be doing it;” 
nevertheless, it seems possible to distinguish between not only the choice to join, but whether 
those who do are genuinely committed to working with it and, hence, whether the subsequent 
unit RC or RI is likely to become effectual. In what follows, we outline some further 
considerations on what these more specific factors might be, yet their detailed analysis have to 
stay on our agenda for future investigation.  
We end with a consideration of the most obvious factors leading to integration and demonstrate 
how they can all fail because of one single issue – the political regime of the national state. 
1. Prior density of intra-regional trade and investment.51 This is one of the most important 
pre-requisites for successful RI. We will consider this and following issues within the 
context of post-Soviet Eurasia. All former Soviet republics were (and still are) deeply 
                                                          
48 Bruno Arpino and Anastassia V. Obydenkova, “Democracy and Political Trust Before and After the Great 
Recession 2008: The European Union and the United Nations,” Social Indicators Research Online first: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-019-02204-x  (2019). 
49 The population of Russia, at least before the EU sanctions, had deep distrust in national politicians and a high 
level of trust in the EU. The EU has been perceived as a superior regional organization and the populations of 
REAs have a high regard for and trust in the EU. 
50 Article 4 (c) Principles, Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 
(October 21, 2015) https://www.sadc.int/files/5314/4559/5701/Consolidated_Text_of_the_SADC_Treaty_-
_scanned_21_October_2015.pdf (accessed on March 12, 2020), p. 9. 




interconnected in terms of inter-regional trade and infrastructure, especially, but not 
only, of gas and oil pipelines, which contributes to the high interdependence of these 
states - a single supply chain and high density of prior intra-regional trade turned into 
an obstacle for democratization of the region and declined chances for RI. 
2. Geographic proximity: 52  The Soviet government invested tremendous effort in 
fostering transport interconnection across vast Soviet republics: Eastern European 
republics were closely connected through one of the largest train systems to have 
existed in the 20th century, to Central Asian states as well as to the Caucasus). All of 
the Soviet republics were linked through shared borders and geographic proximity. 
Beyond former USSR, democratic Mongolia surrounded by autocratic China and 
Russia. Therefore, despite geographic proximity and continuity, firmly abstains from 
involvement in multiple TROs launched by them. 
3. Shared historical experiences (especially war and its aftermath, but remembering that 
these can be re-calibrated in the course of RC or RI). Being republics of the USSR, all 
the former Soviet states share a century of history (e.g., all were involved in World War 
II as one united front). This apart, a century of shared history meant that their 
populations were heavily influenced by the same powerful ideology of Marxism-
Leninism that penetrated every single day of their lives, from their formative years 
starting from pre-schools to the universities, affecting them in work places, as well their 
leisure time, through well-developed mass media and cinematography. This should 
otherwise be a significant driving factor of RI should democratization be more 
advanced in the region. 
4. Related to the above, the convergence of general international policy objectives was 
transmitted by government-controlled mass media presenting a particular image of the 
enemy (traditionally, the West in general and the US specifically). 
5. Presence/absence of a hegemon (willingness to pay initial costs, to provide a 
disproportionate share of benefits) is another feature of successful modern integration, 
and can also be found in post-Soviet Eurasia: Russia enthusiastically launched various 
regional organizations, paying their cost (followed by only one TRO launched by China 
in the post-Soviet space – the SCO). 
6. Cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious homogeneity are only relatively important, yet 
they are present in post-Soviet states due to the legacy of the USSR.  Religions were 
successfully rooted out by the Soviet government and substituted by the ideology of 
Marxism-Leninism. One single language (Russian) was obligatory across Soviet 
republics and till this day remains a lingua franca in its TROs, as well as sustained in 
post-Soviet republics through Russian mass media (that admittedly has a higher quality 
and is more entertaining that local mass media, especially across Central Asian states). 
As a result, Russian is widely spoken across many post-Soviet states. On paper, the 
next most naturally harmonious region in the world would seem to be the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) and it has one of the weakest records of RC – to say nothing 
of RI).  
 
While scoring excellently on all the above factors traditionally associated with successful RI, 
the former Soviet republics all lack one important ingredient – a consolidated national 
democratic regime. The importance of a national political regimes in the studies of comparative 
                                                          
52 Zipf’s law and the advantage of internal lines of communication, For Sipf’s law, see  David M. W. Powers, 
“Applications and Explanations of Zipfs Law”, in NeMLaP3/CoNLL98: New Methods in Language Processing 
and Computational Natural Language Learning, ACL, ed. Powers (1998): 151-160, available at 




regionalism is often taken for granted within the studies on theory of regional integration and 
cooperation in the first two decades of 21st century. Though it is often automatically present as 
an empirical  control variable, its’ theoretical dimension requires further scrutiny and attention. 
This study aspired to contribute to further theoretical considerations on the nexus of political 
regimes and regional cooperation and integration. This nexus is arguably important in the 
context of studies of democracies, autocracies, and hybrids that should stay on the agenda for 


























THE THEORETICAL CONTRAST BETWEEN IDEAL-TYPES OF VOLUNTARY 
REGIONALISM 
   RI     RC 
Theory: Neo-functionalism  Realism 
Actors: States plus civil societies States alone 
Regimes: Pluralist, multi-layered Unified, single-layered 
  Democracies   Democracies and/or autocracies 
Exchanges: Monotonic increase affecting Erratic and selective increase 
  firms, state agencies, interest affecting primarily state agencies 
  groups, consuming publics and preferred firms and interests 
Calculations: Imperfect rationality due to Perfect rationality based on   
  conflicting interests and   national interests and omni- 
  experimental basis   competent state actors 
Motives: Commercial gain   Regime survival 
  national survival   international prestige 
  international influence  commercial gain 
Gains:  Absolute (but with unequal relative (and more  
  distribution)    consequential uneven distribution) 
Outcomes: Increased functional inter- Increased political inter-    
  dependence + crises due to dependence + crises due to 
  unintended, asymmetric gains external shocks 
Decision- Consensus +    Unanimity + 
Making Qualified majority   Hegemonic imposition 
Process: Gradual, continuous,   Episodic, discontinuous,  
  surreptitious    strictly monitored 
Product: Regional organizations with Regional organizations with 
  legitimate authority over  coordinating power over 
  selected policy domains   narrow range of policy domains 
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Table 2: The role of political regimes and economy in RC 
 
Economy 
of a state 
RED REA 
Strong Join RC arrangement led by 
REA and RED 
(e.g., India in the SCO) 
Abstain from RC arrangement (e.g., rich 
Turkmenistan opts against membership in 
all RC arrangements) 
Weak Abstain from RC arrangement 
led by REA 
(e.g., Mongolia vs. the SCO) 
Join the RC arrangement whenever they 
have a chance (all Central Asian poor 
autocracies, e.g., Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) 
 




Only REDs Security and geopolitical reasons;  




and mixed:  
REAs with REDs 
Security and geopolitical reasons; 
pragmatic benefits; mimicking RI of 
“only REDs” 
Not possible:  
lack of mutual trust 
 
 
 
 
 
